

Plato on Time and Eternity: *Timaeus* 37C-38C

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Plato's *Timaeus* is the first philosophical work that discussed the concept of Time in the history of Western philosophy. The dialogue explains the creation of Time as the Demiurge's imitating the Eternity of the model Being. This explanation is based on the ontological distinction between the forms, which always are in themselves, and the sensible things, which constantly change but never remain the same. The article examines the key text (37C-38C) in order to observe how Plato defines Time as "the moving image of eternity" (37D). He argues that Time has three parts, namely, "was", "is" and "will be", while it is a mistake to attribute "was" and "will be" to the eternal being. This claim corresponds to the Parmenidean notion of Being, in that it excludes "was" and "will be" (DK B8.19-20), *contra* Melissus, who accepts "was", "is" and "will be" for the one Being. Parmenides, on the other hand, drops the word "always" (*aei*) from Xenophanes' notion of the god (B26). In describing Eternity (*aiōn*), Plato keeps the feature of "always", but rejects the notion of "unlimited" (*apeiron*), featuring in Melissus' ontology (B3) and emphasized later in Plotinus (III.7). In this way, Plato tries to define Time and Eternity by critically responding to the discussions of his predecessors. Eternity can only be conceived of by rejecting typical features of Time and going beyond our ordinary grasp of the sensible world.

A Reexamination of the Middle Platonists' Theory of Time: Atticus' Interpretation of Plato

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In this article, I would like to examine Atticus' theory of time and interpretation of Plato. Atticus is one of the 2nd century Platonists. He is known for the fact that his commentary on Plato's works were read in the school of Plotinus (*Vita Plotini* 14). However, little is known about the content of his interpretation, especially his theory of time, since only fragments of his writings remain.

In *Timaeus* 28, Plato wrote that the world and time are created simultaneously by the demiurge of matter and ideas. There are two ways one might interpret this description: some take it allegorically, others literally. Atticus chooses a literal interpretation claiming that the world and time have a certain beginning (Fr. 25). Concerning this exegesis some philosophers have accused Atticus, saying that an interpreter cannot use the words "before" or "pre", which only have meaning after time's beginning.

According to his fragments, however, Atticus uses these words uniquely, based on his own account of time. His interpretation depends on series of assertions concerning disorder. First, he regards pre-existing

matter as a disorderly state of movement (Fr. 23), for matter lacks order. Second, he asserts that the disorderly state of pre-existing matter is identical to disorderly time (Fr. 19), for disorder wants continuum and time is continuum. Third, he states that the pre-existence of matter means the pre-existence of time in a disorderly state (Fr. 31). From these inferences, he claims that there is another time before the creation of time, and that this world has its beginning in this other, pre-existing time (Fr. 26).

The relation of these two times can be understood from two aspects. First, they have a causal relation, since created time depends on pre-existing time as a matter. Second, they have a chronological relation since one is antecedent to the other. In the conclusion of this article, I demonstrate that using this framework allows Atticus to succeed in his literal interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus*.

Eternity and Time in Plotinus

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According to Plotinus, eternity is the life of Intellect that thinks all forms at once and time is the life of Soul whose activity is discursive. It is noteworthy here that the former is the internal and substantial activity of Intellect, whereas the latter is the external and derivative activity of Soul. Eternity is defined as “life, always the same, of real being around the One,” which “comes from the One and is directed towards it.” According to the doctrine of the inchoate Intellect, it is determined and perfected as Intellect by this activity. This activity of Intellect is the internal and substantial one. Because eternity is this kind of activity of Intellect, the intelligible forms generated by it are in eternity, and “the whole universe There is eternal.” In contrast, Soul generates time along with this universe by its external activity. Therefore, Soul itself is not in time and what exists in time is the sensible universe. It is in this way that “eternity belongs to the sphere of nature which lasts forever, while time belongs to that of becoming and of this universe” despite the fact that it is the life of Soul.

The Ontological Views on Grace in Marsilio Ficino's *In Hippias Epitome*

Keisuke TANAKA

As is widely known the concept of grace had frequently appeared in the theory of aesthetic quality among Italian humanists in the Renaissance era. According to the previous research, grace was often contrasted with beauty by the humanists; grace is grounded on the subjective judgement of personal tastes and senses, while beauty the objective criteria such as number, ratio, scale, etc. The distinction between sensuous grace and rational beauty is obvious, and this epistemological dichotomy has been accepted as a solid framework for understanding the Renaissance aesthetics. But I nevertheless aim at producing a counter evidence against

this framework from an ontological standpoint, that is the views on grace of Marsilio Ficino, who was the organiser of Florentine academia platonica under the patronage of the Medici family and became the most influential neoplatonist of the late 15th century.

In his ‘Epitome’ of *Hippias Major*, Ficino claimed the dialogue to be the introductory work to *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. He classified aesthetic qualities into three categories and each quality has proper cognition mode; sensory perception peculiar to ‘pulchrum (the beautiful),’ rational inference peculiar to ‘pulchritudo (beauty),’ and intellectual intuition peculiar to ‘ipsum pulchrum (the beautiful itself).’ These systematic or rigid terminology is not always found in the original of Plato but rather it is Ficino’s own interpretation; after all, he purposefully included the ‘intellectual pleasure’ with Plato’s original definition of the beautiful (‘visual and auditory pleasure’), and by this including he deliberately connected the level of intellect with the level of sensibilities as the correlatives of pleasure. In addition, Ficino defined the pleasure common to three cognition modes as grace; he said, ‘Volumus [...] gratiam illam tribus animi viribus communiter percipi, tribus quoque obiectis earum inesse communiter,’ and consequently he called grace the beautiful in the level of sensibilities as well as called grace beauty in the level of reason, but in the level of intellect since the beauty itself is an indefinable ‘mysterium,’ he didn’t dare call it grace. In brief, Ficino, being different from many other humanists, didn’t subscribe to the dichotomy between grace and beauty.

Ficino said that grace-beauty would be none other than the effulgence effusing from, residing in, and returning to the One. This circulation or ‘actus purus (perfect motion)’ is an ontological model for eternity and perfection of the Creation, moreover, it has an analogy with ‘spiritus’ in human body. Ficino defined ‘spiritus’ as blood vapour. His theory of it is quite different from traditional pneumatology (especially Galen’s), if anything, follows Pythagorean theory of musicotherapy. Ficino thought music often makes the circulation of ‘spiritus’ become smoother and brisker and it supplies vivid grace to human body, that is health. The circulation of ‘spiritus’ in the microcosm as human body is analogous to the ‘actus purus’ of effulgence in the macrocosm as the universe created by the One, and hence, grace-beauty is the concept arbitrating the division between subjectivism and objectivism.

Sanctuaries and Divine Statues in Julian the Emperor’s “A Letter to a Priest” (Ep. 89b Bidez)

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Emperor Julian’s ‘A Letter to a Priest’ (Ep. 89b Bidez, December 362/January 363) suggests his interest in restoration of traditional polytheist rituals based on moral and philosophical reinterpretation of its ritual practice. This paper examines Julian’s view on the use of sanctuaries and ritual objects.

At the beginning of his sole reign, Julian issued an edict to order reopening and maintenance of the traditional polytheist sanctuaries all over the Empire. The aim of this lost edict has traditionally been recognised as a measure of reestablishment of Roman religions under the reign of the Antonines. However,

Julian could not admit *status quo* of the sacred spaces in his time. He ordered the restoration of the sanctuaries whether they still had their function as the sacred spaces or not. Julian could not dismiss the natural decay of the sanctuaries that had been already lost their function as sacred space, converted to churches or used as sources of spolia for the public and private buildings. When martyr shrines adjoined to traditional polytheist temples, he sometimes ordered the transfer of martyr shrines to the graveyards.

As a ruler, Julian had rather positive and more ethical view on the sublunar civic life and communal rituals than Iamblichus. He stated human being as ‘*zōion politikon*’ as ‘the creature of cultivated community’: every human being is equally destined to inherit family and to maintain local community by carnal reproduction. Moreover he claimed that cultivation, art of government, crafts, arts and sciences are the visible gift from the benevolent ‘culture-bringer’ protector gods for human being. For him, these ‘culture-bringer’ gods were the Helleno-Romanised ethnic deities in the Empire. They were stated as the third ranked gods invisibly descending from the highest realm of the universe to dwell and protect the sublunar world.

Then Julian justified the rites of bestowment in the sanctuaries, namely offerings and sacrifices with invocation and prayer as thanksgiving, as the means of the reciprocal encounter with humans and benevolent ‘culture-bringer’ gods. These divinities were worshipped at the sanctuaries and the statues. Julian stated the divinities were not innate in the materials for the sacred spaces and the ritual objects; with proper purification rituals, at last the sacred spaces and the sacred objects became as the receptacles of the divinities, and they could evoke the presence of invisible gods for the human beings. They descend to them and eternally remain there, even after the destruction of the sanctuaries, altars and statues. Their destruction could symbolise the absence of the gods and the lost faith on them. In this scope Julian seems to have justified the restoration of the sanctuaries to secure the sacred space for mutual communication between the gods and the human beings.

A Comparative Study between Plotinus and Early Augustine on *Ratio* and the Return of the Soul

Megumi KITAGAWA

After his conversion in Milan (387), Augustine undertook an extended project of the *artes liberales*, in which he defined the “*musica*” as an indispensable discipline for the way from the cognition of corporeal things to that of incorporeals. Some scholars maintain that the *artes liberales* serve to find a rational way to know about God, emphasizing their intellectual aspect. Learning based on *artes liberales* means that *ratio* finds traces (*numeri*) of eternal “*numerus*”. On this point, there is a great similarity between the thought of Augustine and that of Plotinus. Besides Plotinus’ concept of reason is not only concerned with the intellectual aspect and also with achievement of virtue. Then, if Augustine also assumes that reason is

related to both the acquisition of knowledge and the achievement of virtue, we would expect the possibility that Augustine gives both ethical and intellectual significance to *artes liberales*.

In this paper, primarily we argue on the function of reason that aims to return to God in Augustine's *De ordine* and *De musica* in comparison with Plotinus' *Enneades*. A similar view in both thinkers is that the function of reason is not only rational thinking, but also the achievement of virtue. The difference is that to train reason according to Plotinus is connected directly with the happy life, because virtue aims at the purification of the soul from the body. On the other hand, virtue according to Augustine aims at the completion of the whole human being that consists of soul and body. Therefore he thinks more important to use the body appropriately in this world.

Secondly we compare both thinkers concerning the experience of the transcendental light in the return of the soul to higher entities. In Augustine's *De musica*, he re-examines the function of the memory in terms of the soul's salvation (VI. 8. 22). Through these arguments, the experience of light in the memory-activity turns to be assistance for the soul with body to harmonize between *scientia* and *beata vita*. Also in Plotinus, the memory is not a passive function of the soul but an active one, and the cognitive role of light is similar with the role of what Augustine thinks of. However, Plotinus distinguishes the memory from the *noein* itself and limits its role.

We think that Augustine developed his thought in *artes liberales*, while fundamentally sharing Plotinus' ideological framework. And we could expect the possibility that Augustine gave to *artes liberales* not only its significance as preliminary study but also its significance as the activity of researching God directly.

Zur Untersuchung des neoplatonischen Gedankens in Schellings Schrift *Vom Ich* -Anhand des Erhebungsbegriffs beim frühesten Schelling-

Shun TAKAGI

Die vorliegende Arbeit unternimmt dadurch, daß man das Beierwaltes Verständnis des Erhebungsbegriffs in F. W. J. Schellings Frühschrift *Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen* (1795) kritisiere, den Versuch, eine Art dieser Schrift als Transzendentalphilosophie zu rechtfertigen, und die neue Untersuchung des neoplatonischen Gedankens in der Schrift als solcher Philosophie zu fordern.

Mit der Absicht, den Deutsche Idealismus durch den neoplatonischen Gedanken wieder zu erfassen, sagt Beierwaltes, wer ein gegenwärtiger Neoplatonist ist, in der *Einleitung zu Texte zur Philosophie der Kunst* (1982), daß Schellings Philosophie der Kunst durch neoplatonische Kontexte verstanden werden könne. Also sieht er Schellings Philosophie der Kunst als eine Ausformulierung des neoplatonischen Gedankens an. Diese Ansicht sei zwar richtig, weil man in Schellings Hauptschrift der Philosophie der Kunst *Bruno oder über das göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge* (1802), die Konstruktion, worin die urbildliche Natur

des Absoluten mittels der idealen Natur auf die hervorbringende Natur Beziehung nimmt, d. h. mittels der neoplatonischen Idee der Emanationskonstruktion, worin sich das Eine mittels der Ideen auf das Hervorbringende bezieht, finden kann.

Schellings Entwicklung des neoplatonischen Gedankens steht auch im Hintergrund seiner Gedanken zur Naturphilosophie und Transzendentalphilosophie. Natürlich kennt auch Beierwaltes diesen Hintergrund. Daher versucht er, in Schellings frühester Philosophie, den Kern dieses neoplatonischen Gedankens seiner Philosophie der Kunst ausfindig zu machen. Im Zusammenhang dieses Versuchs richtet er seine Aufmerksamkeit auf Schellings Frühschrift *Vom Ich*. Versucht man aufgrund dieser Einsicht von Beierwaltes, in *Vom Ich* den neoplatonischen Gedanken zu finden, hat man zwar in der Tat keine Schwierigkeiten.

Ein Grund seiner Einsicht besteht darin, daß er den Erhebungsbegriff in Bezug auf diese Schrift als einen neoplatonischen Begriff ansieht. Aber zugleich kann man ansehen, daß solcher Begriff die transzendentalphilosophische Methode, die Schelling aus J. G. Fichte übernimmt, sei. Diese zwei Ansichten werden sich widersprechen, so wie ich im zweiten Kapitel erkläre. Nun wenn die erste gültig wäre, könnte die zweite nicht bestehen, also verlöre diese Schrift die Art der Transzendentalphilosophie.

Jenen Versuch meiner Arbeit mache ich wie folgt. Im ersten Kapitel bestätige ich anhand von Beierwaltes Verständnis des frühen Schelling, daß sich der neoplatonische Gedanke in *Vom Ich* wirklich finden lässt. Im zweiten Kapitel mache ich klar, daß Beierwaltes Ansicht einen Widerspruch zu dem Schellings transzendentalphilosophischen Verständnis dieses Erhebungsbegriffs beinhalten kann. Zuletzt rechtfertige ich die transzendentalphilosophische Art dieser Schrift und fordere, den oben genannten neoplatonischen Gedanken in ihr genauer zu untersuchen.

The Problem of Time in *Self-conscious Determination of Nothingness* and Plotinus: Tanabe's Criticism against Nishida and his Response to Tanabe

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In this paper, I take *Self-conscious Determination of Nothingness* (1932) of Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945) as main text, and I will point out that in his fourth paper "Self-determination of eternal present" of that book Nishida's theory of time is partly based on Plotinus. Although "Self-determination of eternal present" as Nishida's theory of time follows the framework of Augustine's theory of time, Nishida quotes *Enneades* III 7 (On Eternity and Time) when discussing the form of "Self-determination of eternal present" (6-208). *Self-conscious Determination of Nothingness* is response to Tanabe Hajime who criticizes Nishida's "self-awareness of absolute nothingness" as theory of procession ("Looking up to Nishida's teachings", 1930). Since Nishida basically emphasizes the difference between him and Plotinus, it is unusual for Nishida to set Plotinus's theory on the center of his logic. However, his "logic of locus" in *From the Doing*

to the Seeing (1927) is constructed by dialogue with Plotinus, and Tanabe thinks that Nishida's idea of self-awareness of absolute nothingness is drawn from the One's self-intuition of Plotinus. It is generally agreed that Nishida is influenced by Plotinus, but the part which influence Nishida is not self-awareness construction as theory of procession but in my opinion the problem of eternity and time which subsists in self-awareness. In this paper, at first, I discuss Tanabe's criticism against Nishida and Nishida's Response to Tanabe, and then I will explore the relationship between Nishida's theory of time "Self-determination of eternal present" and Plotinus's theory of time.